Biden Administration Responses to Congressional Questions
- The Biden Administration is pleased to respond to Congressional questions about our policy and strategy on Ukraine, as we continue the discussion on why Ukraine is vital for America’s security.
- The President made the case directly to the American people in his October 18th Oval Office address stating clearly that, “when dictators don’t pay a price for their aggression, they cause more chaos and death and destruction. They keep going, and the cost and the threats to America and to the world keep rising.”
- This wasn’t empty rhetoric. Putin himself has said the Ukrainians will only have a week to live if our support ceases. He thinks he can wait us out. We need to show him he’s wrong.
- If we don’t stop Putin in Ukraine, he is likely to continue his quest for power and control beyond Ukraine’s borders toward NATO. If Putin attacks a NATO Ally, we will find ourselves in direct conflict, as we are committed to defend every inch of NATO.
- The United States has twice in its history been pulled into large wars in Europe. Today, we seek to avoid this occurring a third time.
- Putin’s Russia is a rival of the United States and has been for years. It has deepened its ties to Iran, North Korea and the People’s Republic of China and is working against our interests in the Indo-Pacific, the Middle East, and Africa. We need to continue to push back and protect our interests.
- There is also a global impact. China is watching how we support Ukraine in the face of Russia’s overt aggression. If we falter, Beijing will be emboldened to take even more provocative actions towards Taiwan.
- The President aptly called this an inflection point, “one of those moments where the decisions we make today are going to determine the future for decades to come.” Our support for Ukraine matters.
- As we continue this dialogue with you, one thing must remain clear. For Ukraine to succeed it needs our continued support, and that of our allies and partners. We successfully rallied an unprecedented coalition of countries to provide their own security and economic assistance for Ukraine, and we will continually press them to do even more.
Responses to the twelve questions posed in Congressman Garcia’s memo follow.
1. President Biden and President Zelensky must provide the U.S. Congress with an actual win strategy. Simply stating “we are with you until we prevail” or “we must win” are not win strategies. How does Ukraine prevail and how long is this expected to take? These estimates do not need to be exact, but we should understand the end-state goal and exit criteria.
• Our goal is for Ukraine to emerge from this war as a democratic, independent, sovereign, and prosperous nation that can deter and defend itself against future aggression.
• When Ukraine achieves this objective, it will have won the war.
• Moreover, we want to integrate Ukraine into the community of democratic nations and have it contribute to transatlantic security going forward.
• We are always conscious that a sound strategy must align ends, ways, and means.
о Our end goal is clear as stated above.
о Our means will come from Ukraine’s indigenous efforts to increase their military capacity, support from an unprecedented global coalition of Allies and partners led by the United States, and continuing U.S. support, including this supplemental request.
о As we describe below, we are working with the Ukrainians to ensure that our ways, namely our indirect support, is executed in a way that adds to their military effectiveness so as to offset Russia’s superior size. This means advanced weaponry, training, and cooperation.
• Our approach here is clear.
• First, the United States is leading an unprecedented coalition of countries to support Ukraine—from Europe to the Indo-Pacific.
о This includes strengthening its fighting capacity. By providing Ukraine with advanced weaponry, munitions, training, and assistance, we are offsetting Russia’s core advantage – its superior latent strength.
о Ukraine’s ability to prosecute this war hinges on its economic viability. To that end, we have provided economic assistance which has proven to be a critical a lifeline preventing the economic collapse Russia is seeking to bring about.
• Second, we are imposing severe costs on Russia, through sanctions, export controls, and broader diplomatic pressure. Those actions are degrading Moscow’s ability to wage war and inhibiting its efforts to reconstitute its military.
• Third, we are ramping up our own defense industrial base, a process that will assist Ukraine while also strengthening our broader national security. We will be better positioned to address future threats with the added advantage of creating jobs at home.
• Fourth, by standing firm with Ukraine, we are sending a message to other adversaries around the world that attempts to take territory by force will not succeed.
• Ukraine has made tremendous progress with our help so far, but we are clear eyed that major challenges remain.
• On the positive side of the ledger:
о Ukraine has retaken more than half of the territory that Russia occupied since it began its invasion in February 2022.
о Russia has failed in its bid to mount new territorial offensives.
о Ukraine has sustained and stabilized its economy in the face of relentless Russian attacks against its critical infrastructure.
о Finally, Ukraine is on a path to integration into NATO and the European Union and stands as a staunchly pro-American partner, not just in Europe but also in the wider world.
• Despite these successes, challenges remain:
о Russia has enough capacity to bring forces to bear that stymie Ukrainian advances, at least in the immediate term.
о And despite being severely degraded, the Russian military maintains the ability to damage Ukrainian cities, to destroy critical infrastructure, and pummel the Ukrainian front lines.
о The Ukrainian economy remains fragile, and a dramatic drop in international support risks undoing much of the progress achieved, handing Putin a potential victory.
• Putin’s appetite for further conquest remains undiminished and our assessment is that Russia will continue to fight to destroy Ukraine for the foreseeable future.
о Putin believes his industrial base has ramped up faster than ours because Russia has more excess manufacturing capacity for munitions. While we will catch up and eventually surpass them, they have a window of opportunity in the next year.
• Putin also believes Russia has withstood the counteroffensive and is betting that the west will withdraw its support for Ukraine over the conning year. Putin himself has said the Ukrainians will only have a week to live if our support ceases. Just this week, President Zelenskyy said if western support ends, Ukraine will lose. Putin thinks he can wait us out. In fact, he is counting on it.
• We need to send Putin a clear signal that he’s wrong. He can’t simply wait us out. We won’t quit on our friends and we won’t tire of protecting our interests.
• Maintaining support to Ukraine in concert with our allies through at least 2025, continuing to degrade Russia’s capabilities, and ramping up our own defense industrial base will position Ukraine to retake territory, signal our resolve to Putin, and begin to change Russia’s calculus, opening up an opportunity for a real negotiation.
• It is understandable that some Americans will worry about a forever war, especially after our recent experience. This situation is fundamentally different. We are not a party to this conflict, and we are not putting American troops in harm’s way in Ukraine, nor are our European allies. Instead, we are strengthening Ukraine’s capacity, and weakening a key adversary, at costs far less than direct U.S. involvement in the conflict.
• As President Biden put it, “when dictators don’t pay a price for their aggression, they cause more chaos and death and destruction. They keep going, and the cost and the threats to America and to the world keep rising.”
2. What is the estimated price tag associated with the execution of the win strategy? Selective disclosure and incremental asks averaging $12 billion per month is unaffordable, unsustainable, and unacceptable.
• While the situation in Ukraine remains fluid, our request represents our best estimate of the support Ukraine needs to prevail against Russian aggression based upon the state of the conflict today, while balancing our fiscal responsibility to the U.S. taxpayer.
• In October, the Administration requested $61.4 billion to support Ukraine in Fiscal Year (FY) 2024 for all 12 months of this fiscal year – from October 1 of 2023 through September 30 of 2024 – and acknowledged the need for a glidepath of support for Ukraine.
• Approximately half of this assistance we’ve requested goes directly to the U.S. defense industrial base, strengthening our military by modernizing our weapons, supporting the American economy, and creating American jobs.
• We agree that U.S. support to Ukraine needs to reach a more sustainable path as demonstrated by our October supplemental request. While this request is robust, it is approximately $5 billion a month for Ukraine – versus $12 billion – a lower monthly rate when compared to the total of previously enacted supplemental amounts.
• While that monthly investment is significant, it will provide critical support to Ukraine through FY 2024.
о Approximately half of that amount is military assistance, including acquisition of weapons for Ukraine, replenishment of DOD stocks provided using Presidential Drawdown Authority, and funding to expand the production capacity of the U.S. defense industrial base.
о Nearly a quarter of that amount is continued military, intelligence and other defense support, much of which directly funds U.S. military activities and presence in the European theater.
о Another roughly 19% is for direct budget support, which we plan to taper from $1.1 billion a month in direct budget support at the beginning of the fiscal year to $850 million per month by the end of the fiscal year.
о And the last roughly 6% is for everything else, including repairing and improving the resilience of Ukraine’s critical infrastructure from Russian attacks.
• While we seek a more sustainable state for U.S. assistance, we will also continue to press our allies and partners to do more.
о Due to U.S. leadership, more than 50 other countries worldwide have stepped up and provided over $91 billion in response to the war in Ukraine across the humanitarian, security, and economic/development sectors.
о And, critically, Europe and other partners have roughly doubled the amount of budget and humanitarian support committed to Ukraine.
3. President Biden and Secretary Austin need to clearly update the American people on the status of the war in Ukraine. This includes informing the public on Ukrainian progress to date, outlining causal factors for the current stalemate, and providing a status update on the “spring counteroffensive.”
• APNSA Jake Sullivan has been planning to give a major speech along the lines that this question suggests. He will do so within the next two months, and he will give an authoritative update on the points noted above.
• The President has outlined his views on Ukraine in multiple speeches and will continue to lay out an affirmative vision on the importance of our support to Ukraine’s defense.
• We will continue to proactively brief Congress on our strategy and Ukraine’s progress in the war.
4. President Biden and Secretary Austin must explain why future U.S. investments are necessary. This includes outlining which weapons are being sent and how those specific weapons will help win the war, not just prolong it. Also, it is important to get an assessment of which weapons have not been sent but could have altered the trajectory of the war before today.
• The United Stated has an indispensable role to play in this conflict. Simply put, the materiel we are providing Ukraine is critical to its survival. We are giving Ukraine’s forces the artillery they need to hold the line; the air defense they need to defend their skies; and the missiles they need to degrade Russian positions.
• Our country, and our country alone, has the resources to provide Ukraine with the support it needs to defend itself and to rally the world to do the same. That is what we have done since Russia launched this war, and that is what we will keep doing in order to defeat Russian aggression and ensure this conflict does not spread farther into Europe. Military aid to Ukraine represents only 3.9 percent of our defense budget and only .33 percent of our GDP. This is one of the lowest percentage donation rates among European partners.
• We are happy to discuss this topic further, including how lessons learned have been incorporated into our planning, in a classified setting.
5. President Biden and Secretary Austin must provide Congress with a list of weapons that have not been sent to Ukraine but would be effective in altering the current stalemate. The administration’s current slow-drip policy has only prolonged Ukraine’s suffering, and it is the responsibility of Congress to play a role in deciding what additional capabilities should be offered to Ukraine.
• We are not playing for a draw here, which is why we have provided Ukraine with every conventional capability that we assess will make a meaningful difference on the battlefield.
• Our objective has been to ensure Ukraine has what it needs, when it needs it, to win on the battlefield. We balance all requests from Ukraine against our assessments of battlefield needs, allied and partner ability to donate, and our own readiness.
• The equipment we have sent allowed Ukraine to successfully defend Kyiv and take back 50% of the territory it lost during Russia’s initial push in February 2022.
• We have sent Ukraine tanks, armored vehicles, and long-range missiles, among other advanced capabilities and we will continue to do so as Ukraine progresses in this fight.
• We have also mobilized a coalition of over 50 nations who have provided over $35 billion in security assistance to Ukraine.
• These partnerships have helped to enhance our support. By working together our efforts complement one another to the advantage of Ukraine. For example, the U.K and France leaned forward on providing air launched long range missiles while we focused on ensuring Ukraine had the artillery it needed to continue fighting.
• As the battlefield changed and Ukraine needed capabilities that provide area effects, we provided the АРАМ which Ukraine used to great effect in recent weeks.
• This summer, at the President’s direction, we began training Ukrainian pilots on the F-16 and we are working a plan to introduce these aircraft, led by our European allies, in the future.
• This supplemental will enable us to provide Ukraine with both the essentials and the more advanced capabilities it needs to continue to defend itself. At the same time, we assess that the materiel most critical to Ukraine’s success are the fundamentals: artillery, air defense, and mid-range rockets.
• The truth is that in order for us to send more to Ukraine while also sustaining our own readiness, we must make investments in our own defense industrial base, and this supplemental does just that.
• Together, this support will position Ukraine for a successful 2024. We are happy to provide further details in a classified setting, including the rationale for withholding any other systems you believe would have a marked impact.
6. President Biden and Secretary Austin must explain what would happen if American investments into Ukraine cease. Do we believe EU and NATO nations would also divest from the efforts? Would Ukraine not be able survive and win? If not, why? What core military exports would be necessary?
• The best answer to this question comes from President Putin himself, when he said in October that if Western weapons to Ukraine were to stop, Ukraine would have a week to live. Those are the stakes. President Zelensky echoed this sentiment; when asked what would happen if the U.S. ceased its support, he said “we will lose.”
• We can outline more in a classified setting, but one potent example is Ukraine’s air defenses.
о Ukraine’s air defenses deny Russia air superiority, and have prevented Moscow from being able to bring to bear its many air assets.
о If Russia destroyed Ukrainian air defenses, it would achieve air superiority. Let us be blunt here: this would be catastrophic and would turn the tide of the war in Russia’s favor. Kyiv would once again be under threat, as in the early days of the war, and Russian aircraft would pummel Ukrainian cities.
о Ukraine needs a continual supply of interceptors, which we currently provide using security assistance.
о Once again, our role is unique. European countries do not produce all the kinds of interceptors Ukraine needs. Of the interceptors they do make, they simply don’t have enough.
• That is just one practical example of what we’re talking about and what the stakes are.
• Europe and our allies and partners around the world simply lack the military supplies— either in stockpiles or in their industrial base—to do what we can do.
• Ukraine will keep fighting no matter what but the cost will grow exponentially without our support and they will lose important ground.
• This will not only drive Russia to continue and expand its aggression in Europe, but would embolden adversaries in other theaters, most notably China.
• The United States remains the only nation in the world that can contribute certain individual capabilities and the only nation that can contribute others at scale.
• We can discuss this in a much more detailed and granular way in a classified setting.
7. U.S. Treasury and Commerce need to report to Congress with the level of enforcement and compliance of already approved sanctions against Russia. No one is providing regular and thorough updates to Congress on the existing sanctions.
• The Departments of Treasury and Commerce are committed to keeping Congress updated and aware on compliance and enforcement with respect to Russia sanctions and export controls.
• Cracking down on sanctions evasion, circumvention, and non-compliance is a top priority for our Administration. Our sanctions aim to disrupt Russia’s acquisition of the weapons and equipment it needs and to ensure that the costs to Russia grow over time. For this to be effective, we must not only ensure compliance from American companies but also work to deter companies around the world from stepping in to help Russia blunt the impact of our sanctions and export controls.
• Treasury principals and staff regularly engage Congress – Members, committee staff, and personal office staff- on Russia sanctions in both classified and unclassified settings. Treasury has briefed Congress approximately 75 times since February 2022.
о To give a few examples:
■ Most recently, Treasury engaged Congress on implementation of the oil price cap policy by the G7, European Union, and Australia.
■ Enforcement teams have briefed Congress on settlement actions taken under our law enforcement authorities.
■ In addition to statutory reporting requirements, Treasury provides on an almost weekly basis information on all actions, including designations on sanctions evaders—in the past year, Treasury has designated over 100 individuals and entities engaging in activity to circumvent Russia sanctions and export controls.
■ Treasury has also briefed appropriators on supplemental requests to bolster the Russia sanctions program.
• Commerce similarly has regularly briefed Congress. Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) has briefed Congress at least once every eight weeks since February 2022.
о To give a few examples:
■ Commerce regularly briefs the Senate Banking Committee Majority and Minority and the House Foreign Affairs Committee Majority given these committees’ primary jurisdiction over export controls.
■ Commerce also notifies these committees of regulatory changes on Russia and other export controls
• Both Treasury and Commerce are committed to combating circumvention and evasion and are doing so both through diplomacy and through active targeting of companies and individuals around the world that are contributing to evasion and circumvention.
о Since March 2, 2022, Commerce has added 617 entities to the Entity List— 525 in Russia, 28 in Belarus, and 64 in 23 other countries – in relation to Russia’s war.
о On October 11, for example, BIS added 42 PRC companies and additional entities in India, Turkiye, the UAE, the UK, Germany, Finland, and Estonia.
о Among hundreds of Russia sanctions designations over the past year, Treasury has targeted individuals and companies acting to help Russia procure defense- related items from abroad—in countries including, but not limited to, Turkiye, the UAE, the PRC, Iran, India, Kyrgyzstan, Serbia, Switzerland, Germany, and many other EU member states.
о In February 2023, Treasury designated a Russian procurement network led by Swiss-Italian businessman Walter Moretti. Treasury’s action hit Moretti associates and companies across Germany, Switzerland, the UAE, Malta, and Bulgaria that were covertly procuring sensitive technologies and equipment for the Russian military and intelligence services, including hydraulic presses, armor plating, and armament packages.
о Not stopping there, Treasury followed up in May to target additional pieces of the Moretti network, including a German national as well as individuals and companies in India. On that same date, Treasury also sanctioned Russian procurement targets across Liechtenstein, the Netherlands, and Czechia.
о In February, Commerce and the Justice Department (DOJ) launched the Disruptive Technology Strike Force to counter illicit foreign acquisition of sensitive U.S. technology. The Strike Force’s work includes cases involving the disruption of alleged procurement networks created to help the Russian military and intelligence services obtain sensitive technology in violation of U.S. laws.
о We are also engaged in active diplomacy to complement our targeting. This is reflected in the numerous travel and virtual engagements with high-priority countries in Central Asia, the Caucasus, and the Middle East over the past year, as well as almost weekly engagement with the United Kingdom and European Union to encourage other major jurisdictions to counter evasion as well.
о Notably, as a result of our diplomatic efforts, the EU and UK are also cracking down on third-country evaders and circumventers. We have successfully encouraged the EU and UK to break from their historic reluctance to target companies in third countries – for example, the UK announced on August 8 sanctions against individuals and businesses across Turkiye, the UAE, Slovakia, and Switzerland, and the EU has now targeted more than 20 entities and individuals in Iran for helping Russia acquire the drones it uses to attack Ukraine. We have agreed with our G7 partners to control – and crack down on third- country supply of – every piece of G7 equipment found on the battlefield in Ukraine and we are working with them on new measures to thwart Russia’s efforts to ramp up its defense industrial base.
о Treasury and Commerce have engaged not only with government counterparts, but with companies and financial institutions at risk of facilitating sanctions and export control evasion.
• We stand ready to provide additional briefings to Congress on this critical issue.
8. The U.S. and all NATO members should adopt a full-sanction policy against Russia to include ALL oil, grain, and rare earth minerals. These three critical exports are currently not meaningfully impacted by global sanctions, and they represent the bulk of export revenue to Russia.
• The key objective of our sanctions campaign is to focus the costs of our actions on Russia, not on Americans nor our partners and allies across the globe.
• Cutting off Russian food and energy exports would be counterproductive for several reason as it would raise global prices. This would have several impacts:
о Higher prices would likely mean that Russia gets more revenue, not less.
о Furthermore, as global prices rise, there is more incentive for countries to circumvent and evade sanctions.
о Raising energy and food costs in developing countries would also be a boon to Putin’s influence efforts beyond the direct consequences.
о It would also hurt American families through higher prices at the pump.
• We do not sanction food, including grain, as a matter of principle and American values.
• That posture of not sanctioning food is also crucial to our efforts to counteract Russia’s attempts to blame the effects of its war of aggression on our sanctions. Because we do not sanction food, as Russia bombs Ukrainian grain export infrastructure, we are able to emphasize to developing countries that Russia’s own brutal war of choice has reduced global food supplies, not our sanctions.
• We are instead pursuing a strategy that lowers prices by degrading Russia’s revenue even as its exports continue to reach global markets.
• The oil price cap policy we developed with our G7 partners has kept energy markets stable while limiting Russia’s revenue.
• Russia’s energy revenue has declined 44% compared to last year, prompting public alarm from Russian economic officials. And because this figure doesn’t account for the large expense Russia has incurred trying to construct an alternative ecosystem of ships and services, the real economic toll for the Kremlin is significantly higher.
• There are signs of pressure on Russian government finance and on the Kremlin’s ability to manage its economy.
о In response to the price cap, Russia has invested billions of dollars into buying tankers to transport its oil. As a result, resources Russia could have used to purchase military equipment, including tanks, had to be diverted to support the Russian economy.
о Outside analysts have said Russia’s cost for shipping oil in some cases has gone up by more than $30 a barrel.
• Our goal is to continue to increase Russia’s costs in order to decrease the profits they can use to fight their war of choice in Ukraine.
• In coordination with G7 partners, we are also targeting Russia’s sources of future energy revenues and metals revenues. In February 2023, the Secretary of the Treasury issued a determination allowing for sanctions to be imposed on any individual or entity determined to have operated in Russia’s metals and mining sector.
9. President Biden and Secretary Austin must provide a clear explanation of why the resources being requested are the right ones to win.
• We are confident we are requesting the resources Ukraine needs to effectively prosecute this war and defend its territory against Russia. And we are grateful that Congress has given us flexibility in previous supplemental to adapt our assistance over time, as battlefield needs shift.
• As stated above, we ensure Ukraine has what it needs, when it needs it, to win on the battlefield. We balance all requests from Ukraine against our assessments of battlefield needs, allied and partner ability to donate, and our own readiness.
• Ukraine’s needs shift from month to month. For example, in February and March of 2022 they needed anti-tank weapons. In the fall of 2022, they needed more air defense. In the spring of 2023, they needed 155 rounds and bridging and breaching equipment.
• These capabilities are all vital to Ukraine’s survival and success. We try to balance those needs with the longer-term capabilities Ukraine needs for future success like the GLSDB or F-16s. To identify these long-term needs, the Joint Staff has carried out an intensive study of what type of Ukrainian future force would be needed to defend itself and deter future attack. The findings of this study inform and shape our assistance today. We can brief the details in a classified setting.
• In partnership with our European allies, DOD is organizing an effort to build coalitions around key capabilities ensuring Ukraine’s future force addresses its security concerns and the burden is shared appropriately by our allies.
• All security assistance that is sent to Ukraine either using Presidential Drawdown Authority or through the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative is notified to Congress. In those notifications, we account for the type, amount, and reason for the requested weapons and munitions.
• We will continue to notify Congress before each package is approved and sent to Ukraine.
10. Do the U.S. and Ukraine have alignment on the mission objectives regarding Crimea? Does the U.S. believe the desire of Ukraine to reclaim Crimea is realistic? A classified venue is sufficient for this discussion.
• We are in full agreement that Crimea is Ukraine.
• Over multiple administrations the United States has been consistent that Crimea is part of Ukraine. We will never recognize the 2014 attempted Russian annexation.
• Right now, Ukraine is focused on capturing the territory it has lost since February 2022. Our focus is on supporting them in this effort. We can discuss their current capabilities in a classified setting.
11. President Biden and President Zelensky must continue to provide Congress with a full accounting— to the extent possible – of weapon systems that have been sent and used to date.
• DOD and State provide Congress with information on each tranche of assistance provided under Presidential Drawdown Authority, Foreign Military Financing, and USAI. This information is routinely provided to Leadership and National Security Committees in classified and unclassified forms.
• Once weapons arrive in Ukraine, the Ukrainians continue to provide information transparently and openly about their use of those weapons. Ukraine logs and tracks U.S. security assistance from the border logistics hubs to the front line and provides expenditure and damage reports to capture losses.
• The U.S. government also has processes in place to conduct end use monitoring.
о We comprehensively record all U.S. weapons donations at distribution nodes immediately prior to transfer to Ukraine.
о DoD has also adapted its accountability practices for the combat environment through expanded self-reporting mechanisms and, security conditions permitting, on-site inspections to assess weapons stocks in-country by DoD personnel at Embassy Kyiv.
• DoD continues to work with Ukraine to improve data collection, leveraging improved technologies to expand self-reporting mechanisms.
• We will continue to work closely in partnership with the Ukrainian Government to ensure all assistance continues to be properly used and safeguarded as Ukraine defends its sovereignty and territorial integrity against Russia’s ongoing aggression.
12. President Biden must provide a commitment and evidence to the fact that his administration is not jeopardizing the schedule and cost of critical domestic weapon programs or the commitments we have made to Taiwan FMS programs and Israel FMF programs. We cannot cannibalize the capacity for our own capabilities — or our other strategic partnership requirements — to meet commitments to Ukraine.
• Our support for Ukraine is not jeopardizing the schedule and cost of domestic programs, or our commitments to Taiwan and Israel.
• Our support for Ukraine – and this supplemental more broadly – will increase the readiness of our military over time through investments in the U.S. defense industrial base capability and capacity.
• We are providing Ukraine with older stocks of equipment that is already on the shelf through drawdown authorities.
• After we provide this older equipment to Ukraine, we use supplemental funds to produce and buy new equipment for the U.S. military. This replenishment is done in two ways: through direct, one-for-one backfill of equipment-often with a more modern version of that system – and through investing directly into the industrial base to build more modern, efficient production lines or to address supply chain challenges in critical areas like munitions through the Defense Production Act (DPA) Title III program.
• Our military is continuing to modernize as we send equipment to Ukraine. For example as we send M777 Howitzers, MRAPS, and Stingers to Ukraine our military is able to purchase upgrades systems such as Himars, JLTVs, and MSHORAD.
• There are coordination structures in place within DOD and in the interagency to deconflict drawdown packages for Ukraine, Taiwan, and Israel. DPA Title I authorities, exercised through Defense Prioritization and Allocation System, ensure that FMS delivery timelines are balanced against urgent U.S. replenishment requirements.
• Other partners and Allies benefit from increased investment into the U.S. defense industrial base. For example, if an additional production line is developed to speed replenishment to U.S. inventories, other FMS customers may receive their procured goods more rapidly.
• As a result, our armed forces – and our defense industrial base – will become stronger, not weaker, due to our Ukraine policy.