Western-supplied F-16 combat aircraft have now been in Ukrainian service for several weeks. In 2022 and 2023, some had high hopes that provision of F-16s would be a game changer for Ukrainian warfighting capabilities.
Yet their final introduction has been something of a ‘soft launch’, without the expectations of a sudden and dramatic impact that accompanied other high-profile new weapons deliveries to Ukraine.
Western dithering
Providing fighter aircraft to Ukraine has been called for since the very earliest days of the conflict. At that time, one of the foremost objections to doing so was the length of time that it would take to train pilots and maintenance personnel, and provide suitable facilities – with periods of months or over a year being quoted.
F-16s have arrived in very limited quantities, which will necessarily curb their impact.
With the conflict now in its third year, those objections – and the subsequent delay in making the decision to provide the aircraft – seem more misplaced than ever. What is more, Russia has been given ample time to plan for the appearance of Ukraine’s new aircraft type, and adapt to it.
In addition, just as with deliveries of Western tanks like Abrams and Challengers, F-16s have arrived in very limited quantities, which will necessarily curb their impact. And the challenges of integrating this new capability have already been tragically illustrated by the destruction of one aircraft in what may have been a friendly fire incident.
Furthermore from the outside, there seems little discernible urgency from Ukraine’s Western allies to resolve training and maintenance bottlenecks that will place continuing limits on the numbers of F-16s Ukraine can operate.
Washington’s constraints
After intense speculation as to their possible uses, early reporting suggests that Ukraine’s F-16s are primarily being employed in an air and missile defence role.
One other crucial point is also not yet clear – whether or not the US has placed restrictions on how F-16s can be utilized.
But it is normal in this war for the details of air operations to emerge only weeks or months after the event, unlike movements on land where reporting can be almost instantaneous. Exactly how Ukraine is employing its new aircraft may not become clear for some time.
One other crucial point is also not yet clear – though it might become painfully so later: whether or not the US has placed restrictions on how F-16s can be utilized, in the same way it has done with ATACMS missile systems for example.
Even though Ukraine’s F-16s do not come directly from the US, but via the Netherlands and Denmark, Washington’s policy may amount to a blanket ban affecting Western weapons.
There has been confused and contradictory reporting on what restrictions may or may not have been set on the use of British and French Storm Shadow and SCALP missiles. But one interpretation is that the US has found a way to ensure that the UK and France also do not allow them to be used for strikes within Russia’s internationally recognized borders.
Given limitations on how other weapons systems provided to Ukraine can be used, with strict bans on any use that would impact Russia too severely, it is likely that similar constraints will have been placed on the F-16s.
As ever, the paradox is that despite being the biggest provider of military aid to Ukraine by volume, the US is the supporter that attracts the most criticism, due to the rules it sets governing the use of equipment.
Some expected that Washington’s policy would change following Ukraine’s audacious move across the Russian border into the Kursk region.
As well as the local, tactical benefits, the incursion put an end to suggestions that Russia would resort to nuclear use if fighting spread to its own territory. That idea has joined the long list of other supposed ‘red lines’ that have now been irrevocably crossed.
In theory, that should provide convincing evidence that restrictions on Ukrainian use of US-supplied weapons should be eased. But as I explain in detail in a forthcoming book, that evidence is not useful if the United States and Germany have concluded that it is not in their broader strategic interest for Russia to be defeated.
They have already shown that they will not be swayed by any amount of empirical evidence that their policy is self-defeating, or by calls from other allies of Ukraine, including the front-line states most at risk from any possible ‘escalation’, to lift restrictions.
Probing the limits of US support
Russia is reported to be constructing new airfields close enough to Ukraine to be within the range of US-supplied missiles, if only they were permitted to be used. That suggests that Moscow has confidence in the reliability of US-mandated safe zones for the foreseeable future.
Probing the limits of US support… becomes ever more urgent as November’s presidential election draws closer, and with it the possibility of a Trump presidency.
That’s a continuing problem, and one which is likely to be causing defence planners in other countries neighbouring Russia severe concern. Given the consistent pattern of US behaviour, they are likely to be looking for means to ensure that if they do come under attack from Russia, the US will not try to limit their options for defending themselves.
Ukraine has drawn up detailed targeting lists for sharing with the United States, indicating what could be struck if restrictions were lifted.
That will have been a calculated gamble, after the great care that was taken to conceal plans for the Kursk incursion not only from Russia but also from Washington, amid concern that it would be blocked like other previous operations – and following persistent reporting of discussion of Ukrainian plans between the Pentagon and Moscow.
But that gamble is an essential part of the ongoing conversation, probing the limits of US support. That task becomes ever more urgent as November’s presidential election draws closer, and with it the possibility of a Trump presidency that could bring an abrupt end to all US aid.
Ukraine cannot make good the time that has been lost to the hesitancy and timorousness of some of its principal backers. Its vital task now is instead to make the most of the time there is left: to gain the maximum possible benefit from the current military situation on the front line, and the political situation in Washington, before one or the other changes dramatically for the worse.
Source: Chatham House